'Blood and Oil Essay\r'

'How to explain the post-Cold War power? Some attribute it to identity politics (xi-xii). stride\r\nSamuel Huntington, the cause is a struggle for resources (xii). crude crude colour as special resource: 2001 and since revelatory of the consequences of inunct colony (xiii-xv). Goal of book: â€Å"Tracing the evolution of U.S. anoint policy and weighing its consequences for the future” (xvi). Ch. 1: The dependance Dilemma: Imported oil colour colour and National Security. Cento (1-4). multitude sees it as an extension of the 1980 Carter dogma (5-6).Similar knowlight-emitting diodege elsewhere of multitude as â€Å"global oil-protection service” (6-7). Oil asked to U.S. economic and armament strength (7-10). â€Å"Oil makes this sylvan strong; dependency makes us weak” (11). U.S. policy has been to â€Å"securitize” oil (12). dependance on merchandise oil surpassed 50%in April 1998 (13). Late 1990s policy fence (14). George W. Bush ackno wledges problem but does not real counter dependency with policies (15). â€Å"Dependency is not a static condition”. (15) Forecasts of growing dependency through and through 2025 (17-18). Table of proven reserves (19). Reserves in volatile regions (18, 20-21). U.S. presence in these regions and the nature of the oil industry are inherently destabilizing (21-22).\r\nCompetition (or demand) for oil is increasing (22-23).Result: global economic instability (23).Ineffectiveness of military dodge, which has serious unintended consequences (24-26). Ch. 2: Lethal embracement: The American Alliance with Saudi-Arabian-Arabian Arabia. Importance of â€Å"U.S.-Saudi kind” (26-27). Anxiety about oil supplies in untimely 1940s led to decision in favour of â€Å"substantial and orderly expansion of ingatheringion in eastmostern Hemisphere sources of impart, principally the Middle East” (April 1944, â€Å"Foreign Petroleum insurance policy of the United States†) (28-30). SOCAL creates CASOC and finds oil, 1938 (31).Recognition of brilliance leads Roosevelt to extend Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia, 1943(32-33). U.S. govt. tries to set up the Petroleum Reserves Corp. to buy CASOC’sconcession, 1943 †but impedance keeps it from being realized (34-35). A â€Å"public-private partnership” (David Painter, Oil and the American Century\r\n[1986]) characterizesU.S. Involvement in knowledge of Iranian disjunction oil (35). Roosevelt and In Saud misrepresent alliance, Feb. 14, 1945 (35-37). U.S.commitment to defend Saudi oil fields and the Saudi government †and other Persian disconnectedness oil sources †â€Å"a major theme of cold-war history” (37-38). Iran crisis of 1946 and worry for Mideast oil: need to overcome house servant exemption to overseas commitments led to â€Å"apocalyptic terms” of the Truman dogma (39-41). U.S. helps create modern Saudi army and oxygenise force, 1949-early 1950s (40). Eisenhower Doctrine (Jan. 5, 1957) designed to bolster pro-American regimes in the context of Nasser’s flirtation with the Soviet Union (41-42).Vietnam War forced proxy-based Nixon Doctrine (July 1969); Saudi Arabia and Iran are proxies of choice (42-43). just now it inspired domestic opposition and leads to Shah’s overthrow in 1979 (44-45). warrantor drama and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to Carter Doctrine (Jan. 23, 1980): the U.S. will protect Persian Gulf oil â€Å"by any means necessary” (45-46).\r\n knowledgeableness of Central Command (46-47). Consequences of the Carter Doctrine: huge ordnance sales to Saudi Arabia (47-48), tilting toward Iraq in Iran-Iraq war (48-49), remove Iraq from Kuwait (49-50). Aug. 6, 1990 Cheney-King Fahd meeting leads to Operation Desert test (51-52).Desert Storm (52-53). Containment of Iraq: No-fly zones, $40b in arms to Saudi Arabia (53). 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden’s antagonism â€Å"provoked primar ily by the deployment of American force in Saudi Arabia and the continuing alliance mingled with Washington and the Saudi royal family, â€Å"which was â€Å"a product of America’s thirst for imported oil and the monarchy’s hunger for protection” (54-55). Ch. 3: Choosing Dependency: The Energy Strategy of the Bush Administration. Bush regime’s May\r\n17, 2001\r\nNational Energy Policy\r\n(â€Å"The Cheney report”) (Feigns commitment to sinew independence (56-59). But Ch. 8reveals immensity of growing dependency on imported oil in a chart and calls on the president to â€Å"make our brawn security apriority in our trade and foreign policy” (61-64). Hopes for source diversification (Latin\r\nAmerica, Caspian Basin, and West Africa) â€Å"face high risk of supply disruptions and shutdowns” (64-66).\r\nDefense Planning Guidance\r\nof 1992 and the Project for a New American Century highlight military (67-69).George W. Bush’s Sept. 24, 1999 Citadel speech called for greater power- sound projection capabilities (69-70). A Feb. 3, 2001 secrets document aims at assessing military implications of the energy plan (70-71). These 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes power projection (71-72). Warn terror morphing into energy supplyprotection: â€Å"It appears that theadministration has merged its trine mainforeign-policy and security policies(increased access to overseas oil, enhancedpower-projection capabilities, and intensifiedanti-terror operations) into a single, integrated plan” (72-73). Ch. 4: Trapped in the Gulf: TheIrresistible Lure of Bountiful Petroleum. The Cheney report â€Å"committed the UnitedStates to aeonian dependence on PersianGulf oil” (74-78). U.S. strategy aims atraising Persian Gulf oil production â€Å"from 24.0million barrels per mean solar day in 1999 to 44.5 millionbarrels in 2020” (79).\r\nObstacles: economic,technological, political, and military (7 9-82).Strands of U.S. policy follow a â€Å"strategyof maximum extraction” (82-84). Primaryimportance of Saudi Arabia led some toadvocate in 2002 for seizure of Saudi oilfields (84-86). Social, economic, political,and ghostlike sources of Saudi instability (86-89). U.S. approach is to strengthen Saudiroyal family and progress reform (89-90).Iraq war as a modality of being able to withdrawU.S. troops from Saudi Arabia (90).Palestinian statehood withal backed for thisreason (91). Likewise. calls for reform andfighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia (91-93).Overthrow of Saddam Hussein needed bothto foster Gulf stability and to ascent Iraqiproduction (94-105). Iran’s policies are inopposition to U.S. plans in the Persian Gulf,and sanctions are an inadequate weaponbecause they impede development of petroleum resources (105-07). Iran also hasthe power to disrupt energy supplies byblocking the Strait of Hormuz (107-08).\r\nForthe time being the â€Å"dual-track policy† of Zalmay Khalilzad, consisting of denouncingIran’s government while encouragingopponents of the regime is being followed,but more aggressive policies are beingconsidered (108-10). Gulf problems willcontinue to require U.S. troops: â€Å"No matterhow costly the effort grows, we cannotremove our forces from the Gulf as long aswe remain committed to a strategy of maximum petroleum extraction. To meetanticipated U.S. energy demand in the yearsahead while also slaking the thirst of otheroil-importing nations, the Gulf producersmust . . . boost their combined oil output by85 percent amidst now and 2020, andthese supplies must safely reach theirmarkets” (111-12). Ch. 5: No Safe Havens: Oil and Conflictbeyond the Persian Gulf.\r\n'